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EDITORIAL
The scientific interest in health and well-being
demands well-founded research strategies in order
for the complexities, the depth, and the many
nuances of health-related phenomena to be thor-
oughly explored. Often, but not always,
1 the scien-
tific/philosophical inspiration is made clear. In many
qualitative research approaches, phenomenology
and/or hermeneutics serve as the ontological, epis-
temological, and methodological foundation. Some
authors employ phenomenological approaches, phi-
losophically referring to Husserl or Merleau-Ponty
and methodologically to, for example, Giorgi.
Others describe their approaches as hermeneutical,
referring philosophically to Heidegger, Ricoeur, or
Gadamer and methodologically to, for example, van
Manen. The essential distinction is description
versus interpretation. Phenomenological supporters
usually emphasise description while the hermeneu-
tical supporters emphasise interpretation.
We have looked into this, trying to find motives for
the one or the other choice. It seems that interpretive
approaches are more attractive to many journals due
to its explicit acceptance of pre-understanding and
because contextual meaning or theory is included in
the analyses. There thus seems to be an attractive
methodological flexibility that allows for the re-
searcher to use her/his pre-understanding, which
cannot be ‘‘bracketed,’’ and to move beyond her/his
data. Here exists also some suspicion of the idea of
essences.
Onthe otherhand,itseems thatphenomenological
approaches demand more rigour from the researcher
and allow for less freedom. There seems to exist a
requirement to control ones pre-understanding in
order for the phenomena’s essences to be illuminated
and theories are understood as unwelcome within the
description of findings.
Questions that arose while looking at this were:
Are the differences between phenomenology and
hermeneutics overemphasised? Do the differences
belong to philosophy or to methodological practise?
From a philosophy of science perspective, all
phenomenological and hermeneutical research re-
lates both to the particular meanings and to the
more abstract, general, or essential meanings. There
is an interest in lived experience*in all variations,
nuances, and contexts*at the same time as there is a
scientific demand to transfer the research findings to
other areas and other people than those who where
involved in the research. This is true both for
phenomenology and for hermeneutics.
Again following the perspective of the philosophy
of science, authors duly acknowledge the ever
present pre-understanding, but Husserl as well as
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Ricoeur
further emphasise the importance of epistemological
openness. Practising such a philosophical ideal
means to sensitively open up for the focal phenom-
enon of the research, which is a stance that demands
from the researcher not to let one’s pre-understand-
ing loose, but keep a check on it and ‘‘bridle’’ it.
Reaching out to grasp lived experiences and essential
meanings of phenomena imply that one should not
only put one’s own pre-understanding at stake:
researchers must open up the full process of under-
standing to the cultivation of critical reflection and
a dwelling attitude, as well as letting oneself be
touched in a deeper sense. To study health phenom-
ena through others’ lived experience is a serious
challenge. Researchers who don’t challenge their
own (pre-)understanding run the risk of ending up
with findings that describe nothing but their own
lifeworld. Both phenomenological and hermeneuti-
cal practitioners must seek this openness, but neither
the one nor the other can completely free themselves
from pre-understandings. Further, neither the phe-
nomenological nor hermeneutical practitioner wants
to free her/himself from pre-understandings, since
this realm of experience is essential to intentionality
and the ability to understand anything at all of our
world and its phenomena.
The same reasoning can be used to understand
the input of theories. There is no general rule against
the use of theories, neither in phenomenological nor
in hermeneutical research. The reason for including
theories in the research is that the understanding of
a phenomenon demands this input. If a theory of
some kind is included, whether in connection with
a phenomenological or hermeneutical approach, the
proper place for the input of theory must be
discussed (e.g., not letting a theory affect the
findings until a pattern of empirical meanings is
established). Further, the choice of theory must be
sensitive and every researcher must be aware not
letting strong theories silence the soft voice of the
lifeworld.
Researchers who wanted to understand the mean-
ings of the phenomena that they were interested in,
who were interested in the lived world of people in
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fight for new and different approaches to research.
We can very well see that in such a situation one
easily falls in the trap of categorising and even
‘‘packaging’’ the philosophy, making a dichotomy
between phenomenological and hermeneutical
methodologies, stressing the differences, and neglec-
ting the common ontological and epistemological
ground. However, we now see that it is time for a
different approach.
The animosity between phenomenologically and
hermeneutically oriented researchers has not been
fruitful. Instead of illuminating the field it has
become blurred and young researchers have had
problems in finding their way in the field. Not least
have they been confused by advisors who force them
to choose the one approach before the other, without
deeply founded arguments.
The significance of academic debates cannot be
overvalued and we hope for many more debates
within the area of phenomenology and hermeneu-
tics. But we want the debates to concentrate upon
how to practise openness, how to figure out the role
of pre-understanding and, in general, how intention-
ality and the processes of understanding works.
We also want debates on the tension between
particularities and generalities and not least the
intertwining of them. Last, but not least, we want
debates on what happens in-between philosophy and
the research praxis.
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Note
1. Some approaches (e.g., content analysis) suffer from serious
methodological problems due to their ontological, epistemo-
logical, and/or methodological indistinctness and uncertainty.
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